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Control of the Ecuadoran justice system has long been an objective of whatever government is
in power, and it uses various tactics from imposing judges by force to employing processes that
appear democratic but are unable to maintain their independence. President Rafael Correa's
administration is a case in point.

A history of interference
The most serious incidents of interference with the Ecuadoran judiciary in the country's recent
democratic history undoubtedly occurred during the administrations of rightist President León
Febres Cordero (1984-1988), populist President Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005), and President Correa.
The most outrageous instance took place during Febres Cordero's administration. The 1978
Constitution gave Congress the power to elect judges to the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ), which
it did in early October 1984. Febres Cordero ordered the Policía Nacional to prevent the judges
chosen by Congress from entering the Palacio de Justicia and surrounded the building with military
tanks. The judges were forced to resign, and Congress chose a new CSJ with judges suggested by
the office of the president.
Since then, each elected government has made control of the CSJ a priority, including the
administrations of Presidents Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992) and Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996). Control
of the court was made easier because judges were appointed for four-year terms coinciding with
presidential terms. This continued until the 1998 Asamblea Constituyente, controlled by the rightist
Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) and Democracia Popular (DP), established lifetime terms for CSJ
judges, who were appointed under an agreement between the two parties.
When President Gutiérrez took office in 2003, he also made it a priority to control the CSJ, which at
the time was trying cases related to the 1999 financial crisis. Congress fired the CSJ judges, despite
their lifetime appointments, and created a new court, whose first act was to throw out the corruption
charges against former President Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997), ousted by Congress in 1997 (NotiSur,
Feb. 7, 1997). That action was one reason Gutiérrez was overthrown in April 2005 (NotiSur, Jan. 7,
2005, and April 22, 2005).
President Correa's administration and the 2008 Asamblea Constituyente again brought to the
political stage the need for judicial reform. This time, however, Correa dismissed not only the CSJ
but also all judges in the system and set up a Consejo de la Judicatura Transitorio staffed by three
trusted allies who began to select national judges (NotiSur, Feb. 4, 2011). The Consejo also changed
the functions of the office of the attorney general (Fiscalía General) and the civil law notaries
(notarias públicas).
The administration named an international observer team to ensure transparency in the process,
since opposition political sectors denounced various anomalies that benefitted persons close to the
administration. This observer team was headed by former Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón, who
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praised the restructuring of the Ecuadoran judiciary but noted the lack of independence of some of
the appointed judges and the failure to fulfill necessary requirements.

Submissive and fearful judges
Most sitting judges and prosecutors opted to participate in the new selection process; they also
opted to ingratiate themselves with the administration to keep their positions as the new courts and
prosecutors' offices were set up. Thus, a period of legal persecution began against opposition social
leaders and individuals who challenged government officials.
The trials of Marlon Santi (NotiSur, March 13, 2009), former president of the Confederación de
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE); Delfín Tenesaca, president of Ecuarunari, the
principal indigenous organization in the Ecuadoran highlands; and Mónica Chuji (NotiSur, Aug.
12, 2011, and March 16, 2012), vice president of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de
la Amazonía del Ecuador (CONFENIAE) are some examples of legal processes before judges who
followed administration directives and who have been denounced in reports by national human
rights organizations and international bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), special UN committees, and Amnesty International (AI).
Several judges and prosecutors who did the administration's bidding were promoted to new
positions in the judiciary. One such case is that of Antonio Gagliardo, the former district prosecutor
in Guayas province, who blocked an investigation to determine the origin of the judgment in
the lawsuit against Diario El Universal(NotiSur, Oct. 14, 2011), since accusations were made that
the author of the judgment for the plaintiff was Guntemberg Vera, President Correa's lawyer.
Gagliardo was appointed magistrate of the Corte Constitucional del Ecuador after dismissing the
complaint, despite various items of evidence and testimonies supporting it.
Another example of submission to the interests of the administration is former prosecutor Diana
Fernández León, who has now been appointed a judge. Spokespersons for relatives of 10 young
people detained since March and accused of terrorism say Fernández León exhibited absolute bias,
violated due process, and ignored defense requests that could demonstrate that search and arrest
orders in the case were forged or illegally drafted.

The ambiguity of the new judiciary
In recent weeks, two cases have demonstrated the ambiguity of the Ecuadoran judiciary. One
deals with the 10 youth, known as the Luluncoto 10, accused of terrorism, and the other involves
President Correa's cousin Pedro Delgado, who was the director of Banco Central de Ecuador (BCE)
and led several sales of government assets after falsifying an academic degree to obtain his positions
(NotiSur, Jan. 27, 2012).
The first case involves the detention last March of ten young people, seven men and three women
—one of whom was pregnant—who were accused of sabotage and terrorism. They were picked up
in the poor Quito neighborhood of Luluncoto while they were meeting to discuss supporting the
Marcha por la Dignidad y la Vida that the indigenous movement was organizing that month.
The report "El Ocaso de la Justicia" by three leading Ecuadoran human rights organizations said
that an elite police squad broke into the meeting room illegally, with no search or detention orders.
They held the young people for more than seven hours during which the youth were subjected to
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cruel treatment, while the police looked for a way to legalize the detentions, which was provided by
prosecutor Diana Fernández, who did not finish the legal process since she was later named a judge.
Interior Minister José Serrano announced the capture of the 10 at a press conference and said they
were guilty. Since then, judges and prosecutors who have had dealings with the case have been
forced to agree with the minister, but because of the lack of evidence, they have not hesitated to slow
up the process by not appearing at the scheduled hearings and disallowing evidence of innocence
presented by the defense lawyers.
The seven men were released after a hunger strike and before the Christmas holidays, and the
woman who was pregnant when she was detained was also released and is caring for her newborn
son. The two other women are still in jail. The Luluncoto 10 face a new hearing on Jan. 19, 2013,
since the hearing set for Dec. 10 was cancelled because one of the judges was absent. A habeas
corpus hearing was also cancelled because of the recusal of another judge.
In another case, the judiciary has also shown its total loyalty to President Correa, dismissing several
complaints against his cousin Pedro Delgado, who falsified an economics degree to obtain a master's
degree, enabling him to receive several government positions. The accusations that Delgado had
falsified his academic credentials were denied by President Correa and dismissed by Fiscal General
Galo Chiriboga, a personal friend of the president, who argued that the complaint was never
formalized with the authentication of the complainant's signature.
When Delgado could no longer maintain his lie, he publically admitted his mistake, resigned as BCE
president, and left the country for Miami, where another pending complaint alleges he paid cash for
a mansion using bank transfers from his cronies.
Since Delgado did not have the required academic qualification for the positions he assumed, his
actions as a public official can be declared legally null, including the sale of some assets confiscated
in the 1999 banking collapse (NotiSur, March 19, 1999). Among them is the Ingenio Azucarero EQ2,
whose sale was also challenged, since it might have been sold to a consortium that had no effective
financial capital.
Other accusations against state officials have also been dismissed. Therefore, the new Ecuadoran
judiciary walks hand in hand with the executive and is ready to act on behalf of government
directives rather than on behalf of an independent judiciary that adheres to law, as mandated
by the 2008 Constitution, despite the government's costly investment to modernize the judicial
infrastructure.

-- End --
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